Obscure Group Honors Cuban Spy-Trainee Adriana Pérez 3

The husband-wife spy team of Adriana Perez and Gerardo Hernandez

The husband-wife spy team of Adriana Perez and Gerardo Hernandez

Prensa Latina (PRELA) announced that Adriana Perez, wife of imprisoned spy Gerardo Hernandez, “was awarded the Silver Dove international prize” for her efforts in support of the Cuban Five. The honor appears to have been bestowed by a little-known group called the Central Council of the International Union of World Leaders.

The award ceremony was held in Moscow at the headquarters of the Russian presidency. According to PRELA, other honorees included citizens from Russia, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, India,  Ukraine, Poland and Macedonia. PRELA reported that the awards recognize contributions to “social, cultural, moral and spiritual traditions.”

Editor’s Note:  PRELA failed to report was that Adriana Pérez O’Connor was in training as a Directorate of Intelligence (DI) asset when the Wasp Network (La Red Avispa) was brought down in September 1998. She and her children were deported and permanently banned re-entry visas. Her mission had been to courier messages and material between Havana and Miami.

 

 

 

Espías cubanos todavía dependen de tecnología anticuada como la onda corta y clave Morse 3

Juan O. Tamayo, elNuevoHerald.com

No importa si usted no es un espía cubano. Usted podría recibir mensajes secretos enviados por La Habana a sus agentes en Miami, Washington y otras partes del mundo.

Cada semana, una estación de onda corta en Cuba transmite 97 mensajes codificados en tonos que parecen de fax. Un programa de computadora fácilmente disponible al público cambia los tonos en números, y entonces los espías cubanos decodifican los números en palabras.

Una segunda estación espía transmite 16 mensajes por semana en los puntos y rayas del código Morse, de 175 años de antigüedad, mensajes secretos para aquellos espías de La Habana de más edad o menos conocimientos tecnológicos.

Dieciséis años después de los arrestos en Miami de cinco espías cubanos que recibían sus órdenes secretas por transmisiones de onda corta, La Habana continúa usando un sistema que ha caído en desuso en el mundo del espionaje desde el fin de la Guerra Fría.

Hay muchas maneras más modernas y eficientes de comunicar secretos usando satélites, transmisiones por ráfagas, correos electrónicos únicos, etc., dijo Chris Simmons, oficial retirado de inteligencia del Pentágono especializado en asuntos cubanos.

“Pero estas transmisiones cubanas podrían ser para viejos espías, dinosaurios que llevan mucho tiempo escuchando (onda corta), agentes a largo plazo, que se sienten cómodos así y no quieren ni necesitan cambios”, añadió Simmons.

La estación cubana más ocupada en estos tiempos, y la única estación espía del mundo entero que usa los tonos de tipo fax, ha sido bautizada como HM01 por radioescuchas aficionados que tienen websites tales como Spooks List, Spynumbers, ShortwaveSchedule y Enigma2000.

La misma transmite de 11 a 14 mensajes por día, un total de 96 por semana, en el mismo horario cada semana pero usando una docena de frecuencias de onda corta, dijo Chris Smolinski, de 41 años, ingeniero informático de Maryland cuyo hobby es vigilar las estaciones espía.

Cada mensaje tiene casi siempre 150 grupos de cinco dígitos, de modo que los radioescuchas no pueden medir la verdadera longitud del texto, y algunas de las transmisiones de 10 minutos son falsas, diseñadas para encubrir el verdadero número de espías que las reciben.

Cualquiera puede conectar un receptor de radio a una computadora, donde el programa DIGTRX —usado por muchos radioaficionados para enviar y recibir textos largos— convierte los tonos en números. Los espías usan entonces programas secretos para convertir los números en texto.

“HM01 es un sistema ideal porque no hay que enseñárselo a nadie. La computadora hace todo el trabajo”, dijo Smolinski.

Lea más aquí: Espías cubanos todavía dependen de tecnología anticuada como la onda corta y clave Morse

Communication Schedule for 23 Current Cuban Spies 1

Schedule and frequencies for Cuban Spy Numbers

ShortwaveSchedule.com maintains this listen of reported High-Frequency (HF) radio broadcasts to Cuban agents in the field. Also known as “shortwave” or “ham radio,” HF broadcasts have proven themselves as a highly effective means of communications for decades. While such broadcasts can be intercepted, an abundance of low-cost encryption systems keep the sent message secure. For added security, Havana uses a standardized message format of 150 five-character groups. This technique prevents the listener from gaining insights based on the brevity or length of the broadcast.

Cuban Spy Communications Intercepted Yesterday 2

A shortwave radio (High Frequency) enthusiast recorded this “Numbers Station” broadcast yesterday. Thirty-two seconds into the video, you will hear distinct tones before the automated female voice begins the broadcast.

In the past, a “Numbers Station” broadcast would always consist of 150 five-number groups. Over time, Havana migrated to this hybrid broadcast, consisting of sporadic voice laced together with the digital transmission of compressed data. This evolution both lessens the possibility of errors made by the receiving spy and allows for the transfer of infinitely more information. The Cuban spy will use a cipher program to automatically decrypt and decompress the recorded digital signal.

Other recent intercepts:

October 1, 2013
Cuban Numbers Station HM01 @10715 kHz SW AM
Recorded in Hamina, Finland

September 28, 2013
Overlapping messages from the Cuban Numbers Station
Location unknown

September 26, 2013
Cuban Numbers Station HM01 @10715 kHz SW AM
Recorded in Hamina, Finland

August 31, 2013-10-24
Cuban Numbers Station HM01 @17480 kHz at 2209 UTC
Recorded in Northeast Ohio, USA

Cuban Spy Broadcast Using “Numbers Station” 1



Editor’s Note: Historically, the Cuban Numbers Stations broadcast messages consisting of 150 five-character groups. The uniform appearance of these broadcasts were intended to mitigate efforts by other spy services who sought to gain insights by profiling broadcasts. These newer, hybrid broadcasts merge “old-school” voice with digital transmissions. Also known as “compressed” or “burst” transmissions, the latter allow the shipment of exponentially more information with shorter broadcast times.

Shortwave Radio Broadcast to Deployed Cuban Spy – Recorded Late March 2013 4

HMO1 Cuba Spy Numbers 11635 khz am @0520utc

Nice four minutes of the start of HM01, a Cuban “Spy Numbers” broadcast featuring a traditional female announcer with switch to data using Winradio Excalibur pro and wire antenna. QTH is Tampa Florida and as you can hear, the signal strength is really strong.

Recorded Earlier Today: Cuban Spy Communications! Reply

Havana continues to communicate with its spies aground the world using low-tech, but highly effective High Frequency (HF) radio broadcasts.  Commonly known as “shortwave radio,” Cuban agents and their spymasters receive these broadcasts on a shortwave radio and then type the numeric groups onto a laptop computer using a special disk to decrypt the HF broadcast.

To listen to a agent broadcast intercepted by a shortwave radio operator earlier today, click here:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n67NBHpaDrQ

Editor’s Note:  For more on Havana’s communications techniques, see these Cuba Confidential posts:  “Cuban Agent Communications:  [The] Failure of a Perfect System, “ July 3, 2012, http://cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2012/07/03/cuban-agent-communications-the-failure-of-a-perfect-system/ and “Numbers Station Spies on 40 Meters,”  July 1, 2012, http://cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2012/07/01/1660/

Radio Still Medium of Choice for Many Spies Reply

By PAUL BEAUMONT* | intelNews.org |

In 1975 whilst the Cold War was still being fought, short wave listeners were treated nightly to whatever stations they chose to listen to from wherever, propagation permitting. These broadcast stations carried a catholic mix of information, political views and insights, propaganda, religious ideology (usually with a political point) and music and other cultural statements of the government of the day. Broadcast stations with good signals were the BBC World Service, Voice of America, and Radio Moscow. But not all was as it seemed. Radio Moscow used very high powers so that those furthest from their transmitters still received signals at good strength whilst the propagation conditions the frequencies were selected for the most efficient transfer of radio programs. One could sit in one’s armchair with no more than a telescopic antenna raised from the radio set and hear news from a foreign station and quickly retuning, could hear the same news but with a totally different bent. Even the music was not what it seemed, especially for two particular British spies, one being Frank Clifton Bossard, an officer with Britain’s Ministry of Defence Missile Guidance Branch, the other John Symonds, an ex-Detective Sergeant wanted in connection with Operation COUNTRYMAN.  Bossard was strapped for cash and approached the KGB, whilst finding himself overseas with no funds Symonds found himself working for the KGB as a ‘Romeo Spy’ seducing wives of diplomats for information. Interestingly MI5 denied that Symonds acted as he did and suggested such actions were a figment of John Symonds’ imagination.

The proof came with the publication of the Mitrokhin Archive that gave an excellent account of Mr. Symonds’ activities and whereabouts. Both Bossard and Symonds received their instructions by radio; they simply listened to Radio Moscow at a certain day and time and waited for certain pieces of music to be played to give instruction as to which dead letter box contained a message for them and needed to be cleared. Whether the Voice of America did such acts is unknown, but probable. The BBC broadcast like coded messages to the French Resistance and others during World War II, an example appearing in the blockbuster film, The Longest Day. The BBC also used mention of a concocted news piece on local radio to ensure some compliance of those who had illegally entered the Iranian Embassy but signed their own death warrants when they executed a hostage in 1980.

Read the entire feature here:  http://intelnews.org/2012/08/02/01-1054/