Fox News Interviews Cuban Spy Who Became Mexico’s Foreign Minister. (Former?) Agent is Now a NYU Professor & Human Rights Watch Board Member 5

jorgeTucker Carlson Grills Former Mexican Official Who Plots to Sabotage U.S. Court System With Thousands of Deportation Cases

By Humberto Fontova, Townhall

“Yes I want to use the U.S. judicial system—the immigration courts in particular– to jam, to backlog it so perhaps President Trump will change his mind and stop this ridiculous policy– this unpleasant and hostile policy– of deporting people…” (Jorge Castañeda to Tucker Carlson, Fox News, 2/14/17.)

The “ridiculous policy” consists of President Trump’s executive orders to deport lawbreaking foreigners, mostly Mexicans.

In other words, this “unpleasant and hostile policy” consists of Trump’s fulfillment of his campaign promises and his pledge to uphold the U.S. Constitution when he was sworn in on Jan. 20.

The Mexican government itself has pledged $50 million in legal defense funds towards this jamming of U.S. courts as planned and promoted by Jorge Castañeda, who was introduced by Tucker Carlson as “Mexico’s former Foreign Minister, also a NYU professor and Board member of Human Rights Watch.”

Democrats and the mainstream media would have us gag and shudder at such fulfillments of the U.S. Constitution—because they offend the sensibilities of a former Mexican Communist Party member and spy for Cuba’s terror-sponsoring Stalinist regime.

“Whoops! What was that?” some readers ask.

Yes, amigos, I’m afraid that — either due to politeness or ignorance –Tucker Carlson scrimped on his guest Jorge Castañeda’s curriculum vitae. (We’ll flesh it out in a second.)

But firstly, from 2000-2003 Jorge Castañeda served as Mexico’s Foreign Minister. On March 2nd, 2002, 21 desperate Cuban refugee wannabes crammed into Mexico’s embassy in Havana hoping to emigrate from Castro’s Cuba to Mexico. (In prosperous, European immigrant-swamped pre-Castro Cuba, by the way, the family and friends of any Cuban seeking to immigrate to Mexico would have promptly recommended him to a psychiatrist.)

At any rate, promptly upon notice of this violation of Mexican sovereignty by immigrant wannabes, Jorge Castañeda —a man apparently scandalized by U.S. judicial procedures, especially as regards to illegal immigrants—ordered Castro’s Stalinist police to enter the embassy and drag the desperate Cubans out.

Now let’s expand a bit on Jorge Castaneda’s “credentials.” I hold here in my hands a document detailing how this very Jorge Castañeda was recruited by Cuba’s KGB-trained secret police as a spy, where he served loyally for almost five years.

Feature continues here:  Cuban Spy Jorge Castaneda

 

Castro’s Dead, But His Spies Live On 3

castro_fidel_cuba_79831941By Sean Durns, The Hill

Although Cuban dictator Fidel Castro died on Nov. 25, 2016, the influence of the intelligence services that he created lives on. Castro, who ruled Cuba with an iron fist for five decades, created a spy apparatus whose outsized impact has extended far from the shores of the Caribbean country.

Cuba did not have a professional foreign intelligence service before Castro seized power in 1959. Under Soviet auspices, it created one in 1961. Initially called the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI), and later renamed the Direccion de Inteligencia (DI), Cuba’s most important intelligence agency began training its officers in Moscow in 1962. KGB tutelage proved of enormous value, both to the Castro regime and to the USSR.

The DGI quickly developed into an elite service. Brian Latell, a former CIA analyst, noted in his 2012 book Castro’s Secrets, “Many retired CIA officials stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets.” In Latell’s opinion, “Cuban intelligence…ran circles around both” the CIA and the FBI.

William Rosenau and Ralph Espach, both senior analysts at the Virginia-based think tank, the Center for Naval Analyses, concurred with Latell’s conclusion. Writing in The National Interest, both offered the judgment: “Cuban intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world—a significant accomplishment, given the country’s meager financial and technological resources (“Cuba’s Spies Still Punch Above Their Weight,” Sept. 29, 2013).”

The basis for this claim seems sound.

Cuban intelligence successfully penetrated U.S. national security agencies both during the Cold War and in the years since.  Following his 1987 defection to the U.S., Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a top official in Castro’s intelligence agencies, exposed dozens of Cuban double agents who had infiltrated various segments of American society, from the government to non-profit organizations. Many of the spies had been living in the U.S. for years.

In retaliation, Castro ordered at least two-failed assassination attempts on Aspillaga—both of them, Latell pointed out, involving people the former Cuban spy knew.

Another of the DI’s successful plants, Ana Belen Montes, spied on behalf of Cuba for sixteen years. Montes, an analyst with the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was sentenced to a 25-year prison term in October 2002.

The damage caused by Montes was extensive. Scott Carmichael, the U.S. counterintelligence officer who helped bring Montes down, stated in his 2007 book True Believer that, among other actions, Montes divulged the existence of a secret U.S. Army base in El Salvador, resulting in an attack by Castro-friendly forces and the death of an American Green Beret. Additionally, Montes revealed U.S. assets in Cuba and, in the opinion of former U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, may have offered significant contributions to a 1998 intelligence report that minimized the danger Cuba poses to the U.S.

Feature continues here:  Cuba’s Spies Soldier On

 

The Unauthorized Biography of Cuban Spy-Diplomat Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz 3

Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz

Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz  (Photo courtesy of ProgressoWeekly.US)

March 2009 – Present: Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment (MINCEX) (cover assignment)

Dates not recorded: Central Committee member and Deputy to the National Assembly. Licenciado en Economía.

2005: Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations (cover assignment)

2002 to 2005: Ambassador to Belgium, the European Union and Luxembourg (cover assignment)

1998 – 2002: Deputy Minister — Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation (cover assignment)

1997-1998: Director, European and North American Division — Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation (cover assignment)

1992-1997: Economic Counselor in charge of economic and trade affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Brazil (cover assignment)

1982 – 1992: Specialist on Cooperation in the Division of Economic International Institutions of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation in Havana (cover assignment)

1981: Project Manager with the ECIMETAL Enterprise (cover assignment)

@1981 – Present day: Entered Cuba’s primary foreign intelligence service, the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) as an officer in the Q-2 Department, which conducted operations against Cuban exiles. Following a 1989 restructuring, the DGI was renamed the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

1980: Graduated from the University of Havana with a degree in Economics

Born in Havana, Cuba, on 10/14/56, Malmierca Díaz is married to Grisell Guadalupe Castano-Rey and has two children. His languages include Spanish, English, French & Portuguese.

Editor’s Note: A “cover assignment” is the purported occupation or purpose of an intelligence officer or agent and is intended to explain one’s duties or presence in an area.

On Malmierca’s Visit: Cuban Spies, Businessmen and ‘Useful Idiots’ 3

"Former" Cuban Spy and Current Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz

“Former” Cuban Spy and Current Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz

By Capitol Hill Cubans

This week, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment, Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, is visiting Washington, D.C., where he will discuss business with Obama Administration officials and be fêted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Let’s be clear: Malmierca is not “the Cuban people.”

This trip is not about doing business with “the Cuban people” or any of the discredited rhetoric of the Obama Administration and its new Chamber friends, led by former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez.

During this trip, Malmierca will distribute the Cuban dictatorship’s glossy 168-page book of 246 business “opportunities” with Castro’s state monopolies, which are run by its military and intelligence services.

But it’s also about recruiting “useful idiots” (“poleznye idioty”).

You see — Malmierca is not simply Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment (MINCEX, Spanish acronym).

Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz is the son of Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, a historic Castro confidant and founder of Cuba’s counterintelligence and state security services. In the 1980s, Rodrigo himself entered Cuba’s intelligence services (known as “DGI“) as an officer in the Q-2 Department, which was tasked with “recruitment” and other operations against Cuban exiles. As a DGI officer, Rodrigo would serve under “diplomatic cover” at Castro’s Embassies in Brazil, Belgium and the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York. Then, in 2009, he was named Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment.

Rodrigo Malmierca is not the first senior MINCEX official to visit the United States.

In 1995 (that’s right 1995), Cuba’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Ismael Sene Alegret, traveled throughout the Midwest as part of a month-long Cuban “trade delegation” in the United States. (Click here to see how familiar this article reads). His goal was to “recruit” allies in the agri-business community.

Like Malmierca, Sene Alegret was a senior DGI officer.

Sene Alegret officially served in Cuba’s DGI from 1967-1997. (That’s right, he was still a DGI officer while serving at MINCEX). He was a senior Cuban intelligence official in Eastern Europe — with close KGB ties — where he headed missions in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Feature continues here: Spy-Diplomats

 

 

 

 

Palm Beach Newspaper Warns American Firms of Cuba’s Espionage Threat 2

SpyvsSpySeveral Caveats to be Aware of Before Doing Business in Cuba

PalmBeachPost.com / Filed in: Business

Get ready for another round of “Let’s go do business in Cuba” enthusiasm on Friday. That’s when Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to raise the Stars and Stripes for the ceremonial opening of the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

Before you go rushing into a business venture on the island that was the communist outpost in the Cold War, you might want to have a talk with Ross Thompson at Classified Worldwide Consulting, which has an office in West Palm Beach. Thompson, the firm’s managing director, has a few caveats to share.

In particular, Thompson cautions that Cuba’s foreign investment and business laws present six key challenges that Americans need to think through ahead of time. They are:

  1. The Cuban government will own a majority stake in the company. A 49-51 percent split is common, but Havana has required a larger share in some sectors.
  2. Your local workforce will be selected by the Cuban government. This selection may not be based on skill or merit but by seniority or cronyism.
  3. Cuban managers will be appointed to mirror your handpicked managers, especially if your senior leadership includes Cuban exiles. The Cuban managers will ultimately control many decisions, or influence them, when dealing with your majority partner, the Cuban government.
  4. Everything in Cuba is heavily influenced by Cuba’s intelligence service, the DGI. You must be very careful to guard your own corporate proprietary information. [Emphasis added]
  5. Vendors you may work with may be fronts, or “cutouts,” for other foreign intelligence services such as those from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. The capture and exchange of corporate confidential information is a lucrative business, so guard your files. [Emphasis added]

Feature continues here: Cuban Economic Espionage

 

La intervención y el “apoyo” cubano en la campaña electoral por la presidencia del Senador McGovern fue una realidad, no una sospecha infundada 1

George McGovern, Fidel Castro and Alina Amaro Alayo

Por Enrique García Diaz

La oficial Alina Amaro Alayo, “Adelfa”, en los primeros años de su carrera, antes de llegar a ser jefa de sección en el Departamento Estados Unidos-Canadá, fue la oficial de caso de la Inteligencia cubana que atendía al Senador George McGovern, y ella conservaba con mucho cariño en la sala de su casa, una foto de ella abrazada con McGovern. En una conversación de más de 8 horas en una casa de seguridad de la Inteligencia cubana en Santa María del Mar (a pocos kilómetros de la ciudad de Habana), que el Senador McGovern  sostuvo con Fidel Castro, durante un viaje que realizo a Cuba, la interprete entre Castro y McGovern fue la entonces oficial  de la inteligencia “Adelfa” (Castro no utilizó a su interprete oficial, sino a una oficial de caso de la DGI). De ella pude conocer detalles de dicha larga conversación en la que se “conspiró”, como aliados estratégicos, para transformar por completo Estados Unidos desde el punto de vista político, así como sobre el apoyo material cubano que el senador McGovern había recibido para su campaña presidencial en el año 1972. Ella también me contó que cuando años después, en 1980, Fidel Castro visitó New York para una intervención en la ONU, le envió una discreta invitación a McGovern para que se reunieran en privado en la Representación de Cuba ante Naciones Unidas, invitación a la que McGovern respondió que no podía en ese momento  reunirse con él, Castro monto en cólera y dijo en privado que McGovern era un mal agradecido.

La intervención y el “apoyo” cubano en la campaña electoral por la presidencia del Senador McGovern fue una realidad, no una sospecha infundada. Tal vez la historia hubiera sido diferente si en aquel momento se hubiera sabido la verdad.

Memorias inquietas: De cuando Fidel Castro mandó a vigilar a su amigo George McGovern 1

Fidel Castro maneja el jeep donde viaja el senador George McGovern durante una visita a Cuba en mayo de 1975.(Courtesy: cafefuerte)

Fidel Castro maneja el jeep donde viaja el senador George McGovern durante una visita a Cuba en mayo de 1975.(Courtesy: cafefuerte)

Por Juan Reynaldo Sánchez*

Tal vez el ex candidato presidencial demócrata George McGovern nunca lo supo, pero su visita de amistad en 1975, la primera de las ocho que realizaría a la isla, fue especialmente trabajada por la inteligencia cubana para penetrar su círculo íntimo.

McGovern había perdido la carrera por la Casa Blanca ante Richard Nixon en 1972, apostando en su agenda de política internacional por una normalización en las relaciones con el gobierno de Fidel Castro. En 1974, su rival tuvo que renunciar a la presidencia tras el escándalo de Watergate, que involucró a varios exiliados cubanos. Y un año después, McGovern decidió visitar Cuba en plan de acercamiento y fraternidad, en mayo de 1975.

Por esos días me encontraba preparándome para ingresar en la escolta personal de Fidel Castro y estaba cursando la Escuela de Especialistas en Seguridad Personal. A cuatro alumnos de la institución nos dieron la misión  de servir de escoltas a McGovern y otros colegas suyos del Senado de Estados Unidos que visitaban cuba con mucha discreción; nada de noticias en los medios oficiales cubanos.

Fue así que trabajando con esta delegación norteamericana presencié el intento de penetración de la inteligencia cubana a los amigables visitante.

En el Hotel Tropicoco

McGovern y sus invitados habían solicitado al gobierno cubano hospedarse en un hotel alejado del centro de la ciudad de La Habana. Se escogió y se propuso el hotel Tropicoco en la playa Santa María del Mar, al este de la ciudad. Además, como medio de transporte se utilizó un ómnibus de turísmo con el objetivo de que durante los recorridos que los invitados realizarían por la isla estuvieran todos localizados en el mismo vehículo, pudiendo conversar unos con otros y brindarles a las comodidades a bordo de bar, servicios sanitarios y camareros.

Sin embargo, el objetivo fundamental de la inteligencia cubana, encabezada por el Coronel Ramírez y  el oficial Carlos (seudónimos utilizados) del Departamento América del Norte, ubicado en el edificio de Línea y A, en el Vedado, era que ambos, con fachada de funcionarios del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX), también pudieran intercambiar, oír y obtener información sobre los integrantes de esta delegación.

Nosotros, los oficiales de la seguridad personal, viajábamos en otro automóvil, un Ford negro y también con matrícula del MINREX, vestidos en ropa de civil.

Las habitaciones del segundo piso del Hotel Tropicoco, donde alojó la comitiva estadounidense, estaban totalmente cubiertas con micrófonos y equipos de grabación. Para ello se instaló un puesto de mando del KT (chequeo telefónico) en la oficina de la administración del hotel, a la cual solamente tenían acceso los oficiales de la inteligencia y los de la seguridad personal; ningún otro personal, ya fuera el administrador ni otro empleado tenía acceso a este local. De manera que todo lo que los senadores, así como sus secretarios y ayudantes conversaran en privado sería grabado.

La belleza inclina

Pero la actividad de inteligencia iba mucho más allá. Entre los cubanos que fueron designados para atender a la delegación visitante había una traductora cubana de cualidades muy especiales. Se trataba de una muchacha preciosa, con un cuerpo escultural y todos los atributos para cautivar las miradas masculinas, y el Coronel Ramírez no perdió tiempo para trazar una estrategia. Ideó proponer a sus superiores un trabajo de acercamiento de la bella traductora  a los senadores, y  si algunos de ellos mostraba interés en ella, pues entonces se desplegaría algo más que un trabajo de acercamiento y se implementaría una actividad  de  penetración si fuera posible.

Feature continues here: cafefuerte

 

Respected Defector Exposes Cuba’s Intelligence Presence in Cold War Ecuador 4

Legendary Cuban Spy-Master, Manuel Pineiro Losada

Legendary Cuban Spy-Master, Manuel Pineiro Losada

By Chris Simmons

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz reports that prior to the 1979 re-establishment of diplomatic ties, Cuban intelligence maintained three positions in Quito. DGI officer Boris Castillo Barroso held a position in the Latin America Energy Organization (OLADE), while Luis Enrique Benites Montero “Enrique” and Javier Buduen Martinez “Miguel Angel” served undercover with the Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina (CIESPAL).

When official ties between the two nations warmed, the Cuban Embassy was allowed to re-open on August 24, 1979. Thereafter, Castillo established the DGI Centro within the safety of Havana’s diplomatic facility. He would later be assisted by Commercial Attaché and fellow DGI officer Roberto Oliva, whom the CIA took note of in December 1981.

Oliva is a likely match for Roberto Oliva Ibarra, a Cuban official assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) who served as a representative to the United Nation’s Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) during the latter half of the 1970s.

García Diaz said another spy assigned to the very small Embassy was Prensa Latina Correspondent and Departamento America (DA) asset Oscar Perdomo Marin, first posted to Ecuador in June 1974. Perdomo’s DA affiliation meant he worked targets and responsibilities outside the control of the DGI Centro. The Venezuelan asset was a friend of legendary Cuban spymaster Manuel Piñeiro Losada. During the early 1980s, Perdomo’s boss in Havana was the DA’s South America Section Chief, Jose Miguel Guerra Diaz, who also personally directed DA operations in Ecuador.

Relations between Quito and Havana were downgraded to a Chargé d’affaires in April 1981. A Chargé is the lowest rank of diplomatic representative recognized under international law. José Francisco Ross Paz arrived that July as the Chargé, only to be identified by the Washington Times as a DA officer on August 25, 1983.

The second DGI Centro Chief in Ecuador was Hermes Cachon Gacita noted García Diaz. He reportedly arrived in Quito in 1983 for a three year posting using a non-traditional cover assignment. Roughly concurrent with the change in Centro Chiefs was the return of Javier Buduen Martinez, this time as Commercial Attaché. Other newcomers included Buduen’s wife “Elvirita” and Luis Enrique Benites Montero, who took Castillo’s former position in OLADE.

Ambassadorial-level relations were re-established on January 24, 1984 and DGI Officer Carlos Rafael Zamora Rodriguez was immediately assigned as ambassador.  He was accompanied by his spy-wife, Maura Juan Perez. Shortly thereafter, Guerra Diaz, the former DA Section Chief for South America, arrived in Ecuador as the new First Secretary. Two years later, the DGI Centro welcomed Nelson Quesada (Carlos Alfonso) and Ricardo Cruz Fernandez (Max).

Ambassador Zamora and his wife remained in Ecuador until 1989. Public records show by the year 2000, he was Havana’s Ambassador to Panama and several years later became the regime’s Ambassador to Brazil, a position he held until 2013.

Former DGI Officer Details The Life & Times of Senior Cuban Spy Alexis Frutos Weeden 1

Alexis Frutos Weeden(Courtesy: cafefuerte.com)

Alexis Frutos Weeden (Courtesy: cafefuerte.com)

By Chris Simmons

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz reports Alexis Frutos was selected for the DGI during his final year of high school. He then moved to Havana in 1976 to start his spy career. He married an Afro-Cuban woman who gave birth to two daughters during the 1980s. She was not a DGI official at that time.

During the years of the Reagan administration, the “Mexico Desk” at DGI headquarters had eight officers. Frutos Weeden was one of the best officers on this portfolio. Fellow “Desk Officers” included Yolanda Pascual, Enrique Vilavoy “Henry,” Luis Popa “Alan,” Pablo Avelino Gonzalez Diaz “Avelino,” Blas Andres Perira Luna “Ritz,” Orlando Fundora Jr “Aldo” and chief of Mexico operations Rolando Sarraf Elias “Elias.”

According to the CIA Directory of Cuban officials, Sarraf served as a Prensa Latina (PRELA) representative at the Cuban Embassy in the late 1970s. García Diaz and the CIA both noted Frutos Weeden’s assignment to Mexico City as the Commercial Attaché in the early-mid 1980s.

García Diaz said as of his 1989 defection, the DGI Centro in Mexico had 15 officers and had deeply penetrated the Mexican government, every major political party and all key societal sectors. He believes the (now) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) remains deeply rooted throughout the nation to this day.

Alexis Frutos is currently the Political Counselor at the Cuba Embassy in Venezuela, where García Diaz suspects he serves as the DI Centro Chief.