This Month in History: Cuban Intelligence Used Two-Tier Effort to Exploit Rafter Exodus 1

In October 1965, Fidel Castro allowed a flotilla of over 3000 Cubans to leave Cuba from the port of Camarioca. According to DGI defector Castro Hidalgo, a year prior to the exodus, the service had begun training operatives who used the chaos of the mass influx as both a means to get to the US and to quickly and convincingly assume new identities as Illegal agents. The DGI also coerced legitimate rafters to work for them following their arrival in the US. Afraid to refuse the DGI, many rafters agreed to cooperate.  However, poor pre-departure tradecraft training doomed this latter effort.

Editor’s Note: The General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was the name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name – the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

Exclusive: Retired Cuban Spy is Ambassador to Benin Reply

Oscar Coet Blackstock, posted to Benin since March 11, 2009, is suspected of having been a General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) or America Department (DA) officer. Prior to his current posting, Coet served as Havana’s Ambassador to Canada during the mid-2000s and reopened the Cuban Embassy in Haiti back in 1997.  According to several Cuban defectors, spies must officially retire from their parent intelligence service before assuming duties as an ambassador.  As such, Coet would have been operational during his younger years when, for example, he served as a Second Secretary in Zimbabwe (early 1980s).

Editor’s Note: The General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was the name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name – the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

The America Department (DA) was the name used by the intelligence wing of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party from 1974 to the late 1980s or early 1990s. The DA was heavily involved in supporting revolutionaries and terrorists, but has since become more focused on political intelligence operations. This service is now called the America Area of the International Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC/ID/AA).

This Month in History: Cuban Intelligence Moved into Suriname Reply

September 1982:  Osvaldo Cardenas Junquera was assigned as the first resident Cuban ambassador to the South American nation of Suriname. Cardenas, previously an America Department (DA) regional Section Chief, was an accomplished intelligence officer. Well-connected in the Cuban Communist Party, he was also one of the few black Cubans in a senior position. Some in Washington felt that his race was an asset with members of the largely black leadership of Dési” Bouterse’s military dictatorship. For many years during Havana’s involvement in Africa, Cardenas – who freely moved back and forth among spy services — had been in charge of West Africa operations for the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI).

Cuba’s diplomatic mission was upgraded to an Embassy the following month.  Cardenas’ wife, Ida Borja Paz Escalante de Gomez, was also an Intelligence Officer.  By January 1983, the Cuban diplomatic presence had grown to 10 personnel.  Cuba’s diplomatic presence eclipsed that of the US and continued to grow.  Cardenas’ posting to Suriname and the mission’s rapid expansion was solid evidence of the importance that Cuba attached to Suriname.

Editor’s Note: The America Department (DA) was the name used by the intelligence wing of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party from 1974 to the late 1980s or early 1990s. The DA was heavily involved in supporting revolutionaries and terrorists, but has since become more focused on political intelligence operations. This service is now called the America Area of the International Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC/ID/AA).

General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI): The name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name – the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

Today in History: Cuba Established Spy Center in Washington, DC Reply

September 1, 1977:  The US and Cuba re-established diplomatic missions in Havana and Washington, DC.  The first chief of the Cuban Interests Section was Ramon Sanchez-Parodi.  This career intelligence officer subsequently served in Washington for 12 consecutive years Experts remain undecided as to whether he belonged to the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) or the America Department (DA).  Also serving at the new Interest Section was Teofilo Acosta, whom the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) immediately identified as a senior Cuban Intelligence Officer.

In testimony before the US Senate, Dr Daniel James charged Sanchez-Parodi with targeting the Congressional Black Caucus to foment  opposition to existing US policies towards Cuba. According to the New York Times, Sanchez-Parodi was extremely well connected to the US academic, civic, cultural, and business communities.  He was promoted to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately following his US tour.  His portfolio was the Western Hemisphere.

Editor’s Note: The America Department (DA) was the name used by the intelligence wing of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party from 1974 to the late 1980s or early 1990s. The DA was heavily involved in supporting revolutionaries and terrorists, but has since become more focused on political intelligence operations. This service is now called the America Area of the International Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC/ID/AA).

General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI):  The name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior.  Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name –the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

This Date in History: Cuba Targeted Visiting Panamanian Delegation Reply

August 23 – September 5, 1972:  The University of Panama sent a cultural and scientific delegation to visit Cuba.  Operating in alias under Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) cover, DGI officer Norberto Hernandez Curbelo served as an delegation escort.  Without providing details, Hernandez told the delegates he had been in Panama on several occasions.  According to declassified US government records, Hernandez visited Panama with a Cuban sports delegation from late May through early June 1972.

Editor’s Note:  The Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) was the name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name– the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

Cuban Role Demands More Scrutiny As Brazil Investigates Military Dictatorship’s Abuses 2

Yesterday, the New York Times’ published a great story on human rights abuses during the 1960s-1970s by Brazil’s military junta  The Time’s Brazil Bureau chief, Simon Romero,  authored the feature, which can be found here:  (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/world/americas/president-rousseffs-decades-old-torture-detailed.html?pagewanted=all).  Omitted from this piece, however, is the extensive role Havana played in subverting the Brazilian nation, in part, serving as a catalyst for the military dictatorship.  While not excusing military abuses by any means, context provides clarity and as such, Cuba’s hidden hand must also be examined.  My modest contribution to shedding light on these ties follows.

DGI officer Jorge Timossi Corbani, a founding member of Cuba’s Prensa Latina news agency, served in Brazil from 1959-1960. In late 1961, Havana assigned Ramiro Rodriguez Gomez as 1st Secretary and chief of the DGI Centro in Rio de Janeiro, which was then Brazil’s capital.  Fellow DGI officer and newly assigned Cultural Attaché, Miguel Brugueras del Valle joined Rodriguez shortly thereafter.  A third Intelligence Officer in the 12-member diplomatic staff was Guillermo Rivas Porta.

From 1961-1963, Cuban Intelligence provided financial aid to Brazilian revolutionaries who sought to create guerilla training camps in the state of Goias.  Additionally, peasant leader Francisco Juliao and Governor Leonel Brizola received DGI financial support.  In April 1963, Raul Roa Kouri became Havana’s Ambassador to Brazil.  Following his appointment, he became the conduit for Cuban funds and direction to its Brazilian allies.  Ambassador Roa, son of Cuba’s Foreign Minister, assessed Governor Brizola as the Brazilian revolutionary with the greatest potential for success. Two DGI couriers were enroute to Brazil with money for Brizola when President Joao Goulart was overthrown on March 31, 1964.  In total, the DGI had made $10 million available to Govenor Brizola.

Havana withdrew most of its embassy staff shortly after the military revolt. Rodriguez remained the Centro Chief until Brazil severed ties with Cuba on May 13, 1964. Only two Cuban officials served in Brazil when relations were severed.  Cuba’s continued support for Brazilian leftists was largely responsible for Brazil ending diplomatic ties.  That year, spymaster Manuel Pineiro assigned Ulises Estrada to oversee and participate in guerilla warfare training for a group of former Brazilian soldiers who fled to Cuba following a failed coup attempt. Throughout the remainder of the 1960s, Cuban support to Brazilian revolutionaries appears centered around training guerrillas and serving as the preferred safe haven for Brazil’s terrorists and revolutionaries. During this decade, Cuba trained at least 150 Brazilians (and perhaps over 200) in guerrilla warfare. During the latter half of the 1960s, the main faction trained was the National Liberating Action (ALN). ALN founder Carlos Marighella had extensive ties with Havana and its Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO).  Killed by police in 1969, Marighella achieved immortality when LASO’s flagship publication, Tricontinental, published his book, the Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla in 1970. Subsequently, Cuba translated Marighella’s book into several languages and distributed it worldwide.

By late 1971, the Brazilian regime’s aggressive effort to eliminate the guerrillas, coupled with their own internal dissention, led to the disorganization and demoralization of the revolutionaries. Many guerrillas and their supporters were killed or captured, their supplies destroyed, and their documents seized and exploited.  America Department officer Manuel Basabe was allegedly arrested in Brazil in the early 1970s for weapons smuggling.  By the mid-1970s, Brazilian police and military had broken up the Cuba-encouraged guerrilla groups.

Editor’s Notes: 

America Department (DA):  The name used by the intelligence wing of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party from 1974 to the late 1980s or early 1990s.  The DA was heavily involved in supporting revolutionaries and terrorists, but has since become more focused on political intelligence operations.  This service is now called the America Area of the International Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC/ID/AA).

Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI):  The name previously used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior.  Following a 1989 “scandal” and reorganization, this service was reorganized and given a new name –the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).        

Falling Short in Understanding Cuban Intelligence: Part I in a Series 5

In “Cuba’s Intelligence Machine,” the newly released assessment by The University of Miami’s Cuba Transition Project, Dr. Brian Latell provides a breezy and very readable summary of Cuban Intelligence with two notable exceptions:

1. The primary mission and target of Cuban Intelligence is incorrect.
2. The number of Cuban operations known to have been destroyed/degraded by US Counterintelligence is grossly understated.

Today, I will address the first issue.   In “Cuba’s Intelligence Machine,” Latell claims the United States is “the raison d’être” of Cuban intelligence, according to still another experienced defector I interviewed.” 

In reality, the primary target of the Castro regime’s intelligence services are the Cuban people.  The core mission of its five-service Intelligence Community remains regime protection.    Maintaining domestic stability in support of government continuity is the overriding concern.  This is consistent with other totalitarian regimes and characterized by its two Counterintelligence services dominating the manpower of Cuba’s Intelligence Community.  The collection of intelligence on foreign enemies has remained second to domestic control and monitoring of the Cuban people.

Historically, Castro’s foreign intelligence services focused on the collection of intelligence on foreign enemies. Throughout the Cold War, these services were also viewed as primary tools “to export the Revolution.”  Currently, the United States is the regime’s sole foreign target. 

According to defector Juan Antonio Rodriguez Menier, the General Directorate of Counterintelligence (DGCI) [now called simply the Directorate of Counterintelligence (DCI)], has remained the most important intelligence service in revolutionary Cuba.  According to the Library of Congress, at its peak, the DGCI/DCI numbered 20,000 personnel.  However, as the Castro regime consolidated its domestic controls, the DGCI/DCI drew down.  At the time of Rodriguez Menier’s 1987 defection, its manpower had declined to roughly 3,000 personnel.  

Likewise, during the Cold War, the Cuban Military’s Counterintelligence service (CIM) was reportedly as large as the DGCI/DCI.  However, during the 1990s, armed forces manning was slashed by an estimated 53 percent.  This likely led to similar manpower cuts in the CIM.  Despite these losses, according to defectors and émigrés, the CIM still reportedly numbers several thousand personnel. 

In stark contrast to Havana’s robust Counterintelligence organizations, its three foreign intelligence services, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM), and the intelligence wing of the Cuban Communist Party number less than 3,300 total personnel.

Latell’s error has been to focus overwhelmingly on the DI, rather than examine Cuba’s entire “intelligence machine.”  Additionally, his research is further undermined by excessive reliance of DI defectors.  The US has been blessed with an abundance of Cuban defectors and émigrés, many of which can and have provided ample insights into the inner workings of regime intelligence.  This information is further enhanced by intelligence provided by defectors from Cuba’s Cold War allies.   Successful US Counterintelligence investigations and operations have also produced a veritable treasure trove of information on Havana’s “intelligence machine.”  For example, government holdings from the Wasp Network alone are said to number roughly 100,000 pages. 

Brian Latell has devoted his life to providing valuable insights into regime dynamics in general and the Castro brothers in particular.  That said, when it comes to Cuba’s spy services, I fear he has stepped outside his realm of expertise.

See his assessment, “Cuba’s Intelligence Machine,” here:  The July 2012 Latell Report

This Date in History: Legendary Spymaster in Chile to Advise Salvador Allede 1

July 30, 1973:  As resistance to Allende increased during 1973, Castro wrote and told him he was secretly dispatching Manuel “Redbeard” Pineiro to assess the situation and offer his professional opinion. At the time, Pineiro lead the National Liberation Directorate (DLN), a 400-man element, previously assigned to the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), which oversaw support to foreign revolutionary movements.

Pineiro and Vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrived on July 30th under the pretext of discussing the agenda for the forthcoming meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  After Rafael Rodriguez publicly claimed that Chile was the only nation in the Americas where a non-violent road to socialism was possible, Pineiro delivered Castro’s letter to Allende.  The two Cuban officials made confidential recommendations to Allende and then left at the end of their five-day stay. Castro’s advice to Allende to consolidate his gains and eliminate his opposition was repeated in August and again rejected by Allende.

This Month in History: Cuban Intelligence in Argentina Since At Least 1964 Reply

July 1964:  According to two declassified CIA documents, Oreste Varela led the “Argentina Desk,” which made him responsible for all operations in Argentina led by the DGI’s National Liberation Section.

Editor’s Note:   The Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) was the name used by the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior until 1989.  At that time, it was reorganized and renamed the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) following a “corruption scandal.”